The White City Grenade Attack And Its National Security Implications

“Make us enemies of every people on earth, but save us from civil war” - Lucan, Bellum Civile, c. 48.

The aftermath of the grenade attack.

The grenade attack aimed at assassinating President Emmerson Mnangagwa of Zimbabwe, at White City Stadium, on 23 June 2018, missed its target completely but killed 2 aides and injured Vice President Kembo Mohadi as well as Minister Oppah Muchinguri Kashiri. This grenade could have potentially wiped out the country’s Presidency and a host of high ranking officials. There was no claim of responsibility so we can only make educated guesses as to who was responsible. As for the National Security implications, we can discuss that with what approaches mathematical certainty.

Who Was Responsible?

If we really want to get to know who was responsible, we must discuss matters objectively. First to go is the notion that what happened in Zimbabwe in November was not a Coup. It was a Military Coup. Necessary yes, but it was a Military Coup. Whoever was aggrieved by this change of the man at the helm, is the first suspect in deciding who could have tried to assassinate the current President. This step will also allow us to get to the next step: political implications had the assassination attempt succeeded.

President Mnangagwa has accused the G40 faction in ZANU PF as the people responsible for this latest attempt on his life. The G40 was the other competitor to succeed Robert Mugabe, and they lost out their pole position when Mugabe was removed from power. By accusing the G40, President Mnangagwa is really accusing Robert Mugabe, as the G40 was Mugabe’s favoured project in ZANU PF prior to his ouster. The accusation against Robert Mugabe also sticks because he has not been repentant, and has shown himself very willing to politically undermine President Emmerson Mnangagwa. Either Robert Mugabe ordered the grenade attack himself, or those still loyal to him did it without his say so, but he would have been the (willing) political beneficiary had the attack succeeded.

If I know the above dynamics, enemies of Zimbabwe also know the same dynamics and could have carried out the attack to throw the country, or at least ZANU PF, into civil war/conflict. As to what these other people would benefit from such a scenario, one would have to know all the concerned parties and their interests, and how those interests would be served by a civil war. It is beyond the scope of this short entry to make such an analysis.

Political Implications:

Had President Mnangagwa and his two Vice Presidents been eliminated, Constitutional Lawyers will tell you that the Speaker of Parliament would have assumed the Presidency until Elections had been held, but that’s just lazy theorizing. The reality is this: those who carried out this attack would have wanted Robert Mugabe reinstated as President, as a “corrective measure” against the Military Coup that removed him in November. It would then be up to Mugabe to go ahead with Elections, or declare a State of Emergency to allow him time to get back at his “enemies” in the Armed Forces of Zimbabwe. This is also where the grenade attack planners show their myopia, or desperation; the Military, instead, would have stepped in automatically and ruled Zimbabwe under State of Emergency powers. There is a unity in the Command Element of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces that has defied outsider meddling for a long time (as Robert Mugabe found out when he tried to set then Lt. General Valerio Sibanda, against General Chiwenga, on his return from China in November last year).

National Security Implications:

The throwing of the grenade was a desperate act of people who would rather see the country burn in a civil war than prosper under someone else. A scorched earth policy mentality that very much characterised Robert Mugabe’s conduct towards the time of his removal from office. The possibility of a civil war was there had President Mnangagwa’s calming influence at the helm been removed. The military’s first instinct is to use force. After all, you can be assured that Robert Mugabe has not yet suffered the fate of Gaddafi only because President Mnangagwa holds in check, this extreme instinct of the security establishment. Robert Mugabe also did this same thing very well with Morgan Tsvangirayi. There are times when Diplomacy trumps the use of force. Without this calming civilian influence, the military would make missteps that will lead to civil war (or the need for intervention by outsiders).

The Tight Embrace Between Terrorism And The Electronic Media?

Participating at the 13th International Terrorism and Electronic Media Conference in Sofia, Bulgaria.

by Kudakwashe Kanhutu.

Sofia, Bulgaria.   

It is quite the intractable problem for humanity through the ages isn’t it, that good and bad exist so proximately that they are, in fact, two sides of the same coin. Flip the coin this way and the good side faces you, flip it again and there is every chance that it’s the bad side that faces you. Technology and innovation espouse this metaphor most emphatically, as every piece of technology ever invented to aid humanity positively, can also be used to harm humanity. Case in point, at the dawn of Terrorism, Dynamite, whose primary purpose was to make mining and construction easier, was quite the God sent for anarchist terrorism – the power that had previously been the preserve of States, became easily available to individuals. It is, therefore, humanity’s lot that every advantage comes with a disadvantage, every opportunity creates vulnerability. 

Indeed, it’s a very thin line that separates good from bad in almost every aspect of human affairs; free speech can easily stray into hate speech, explaining issues can be misconstrued as glorifying them and, that last example is especially pertinent to the Media and Terrorism sphere. There seems to be a tight embrace between Terrorism and the Media. As Terrorism is said to never be aimed at its victims, but at its audience, the Media tends to always be, perhaps unwittingly, the “megaphone” of Terrorism. If the above premise holds, there is even a tighter embrace between Terrorism and the Electronic Media. Technology and Innovation have democratised the Media space, and various actors, including the Terrorists themselves, now have their own “megaphones.” Technology can now be used equally to glorify the good as well as the bad. 

This conundrum is exactly what the International Academy of Television and Radio (IATR ) wants to appraise every year. They hold an annual conference to survey exactly what the relationship is between Terrorism and the Media, especially Electronic Media. There is no shortage of guidelines as the United Nations’ various bodies have discussed the issue ad infinitum. The IATR conference is a chance to discuss what these guidelines mean in practice. It is attended by journalists, civil society, academics, and government officials, who all then exchange views on what the field looks like to them. It’s a chance to discuss each other’s concerns and constraints which culminates in an outcome document. 

While the duty of every responsible citizen is to contribute to the well-being of society, for example by not glorifying Terrorism, the discussions at this year’s 13th International Conference in Sofia Bulgaria, leaned more towards the governments’ worldview, to the exclusion of the legitimate concerns of those who tend to resort to Terrorism. I suppose it was inevitable that the discussion would turn out like this, because as I said above, saying Terrorists have legitimate concerns could be easily be misconstrued as sympathising with them, and can even land one in prison. I got the impression however, that the gathering is open to new ideas. What is needed at next year’s conference, is more people from the critical schools of thought who will challenge the gathering if it falls too much on the side of establishment mentality. The networking value of the same event is great, in that it can create a just-below-government consensus, that can then inform policy, even among governments that are antagonistic towards each other.

13th International Terrorism and Electronic Media Conference.

Bulgarian Defence Minister Krasimir Karakachanov at the Conference.

Bulgarian Defence Minister Krasimir Karakachanov at the Conference.

Discussing the current state of terrorism and electronic media with delegates from Croatia, Serbia and Romania. 

Stjepan Mesić, the last President of Yugoslavia before dissolution, the Syrian Ambassador to Bulgaria, the President of the Serbian Parliament and various other attendees.

Stjepan Mesić, the last President of Yugoslavia before dissolution.

Stjepan Mesić, the last President of Yugoslavia before dissolution.

Islamic State On The Korean Peninsula

“As we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns - the ones we don’t know we don’t know” - Donald Rumsfeld, United States Secretary of Defense.

What comes after Kim Jong-un? That is the question.

by Kudakwashe Kanhutu

Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defence under George W. Bush during the 2003 Iraq invasion, said something that greatly amused pundits, he said: “As we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns—the ones we don’t know we don’t know.” While pundits and comedians were amused insofar as this could be a punchline when they tell their next joke at a party, the person who studies international dynamics, to make predictions on the next security threats, must take a different instruction from the “unknown unknowns” quote.

Donald Rumsfeld was trying to make the case that they should invade Saddam Hussein’s Iraq to obviate the danger of the “unknown unknowns” threat from Saddam Hussein. In hindsight, it was a disingenuous and cynical claim, because as it turns out, the invasion caused more instability and suffering than any unknown Saddam Hussein capability. This is not lost on analysts who notice that, the result of the invasion, was suffering for the Iraqis, and the creation of a hitherto unheard of armed group that now threatens Europe at will – the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

With the knowledge we now have of how things turned out in Iraq and Libya, after United States regime change actions there, we can make the case – with mathematical certainty – that if the United States attacks North Korea as threatened, the outcome is knowable. The United States thinks it can make a decapitating strike on the North Korean Supreme Leader. This will then lead to the population being freed from a dictatorship and thus there will be no retaliatory strikes from North Korean Rocket Forces. The problem with that line of reasoning is that experience belies it. It is no longer a case of unknown unknowns what will happen after regime change action, but known knowns: civil war and rise of armed non-state actors in those ungoverned spaces.

What will happen if the United States attacks North Korea, is that North Korea’s Rocket Forces will retaliate with missiles against South Korea and Japan – a situation which will put over 20 million people directly in harm’s way. But even if this danger was not there, and Kim Jong-Un could be removed by force, wherever a power vacuum has occurred, non-state armed groups have invariably filled the vacuum. We have never heard of a single terrorist attack in North Korea, but this will not be the case once the monopoly on the legitimate use of force is taken away. And with Islamic State being the umbrella of choice for those aggrieved by the West, it is not inconceivable that terrorist attacks against Western interests will start happening on the Korean Peninsula, if use of force is pursued as an option against North Korea. 

Zimbabwe's Coming Civil War: A Cadmean Victory

Great Zimbabwe, the ruins near Masvingo where Zimbabwe draws its name from. Picture Credit: Great Zimbabwe University.

"Make us enemies of every people on earth, but save us from civil war" - Lucan: Bellum Civile, c. 48

I attended a discussion at Oxford University on reforming the security sector in Zimbabwe, and the general gist of the discussion led me to believe that "reform" was actually a euphemism for "weakening the security services." A respected academic no less, said to me, in confidence; "the problem in Zimbabwe is how to get arms of war to the general population." That's what he said to me.

Well, history is philosophy teaching by examples. The Security Sector Reform discussion I attended was held before the examples we now have of Syria, Yemen and Libya. What these examples have incontrovertibly shown us is that a civil war can only result in a Cadmean Victory - a victory purchased with one's own ruin.

The Most Potent Global Security Threat Of The Twenty First Century

The unthinkable is the logical conclusion of all the great powers' strategic manoeuvring. Picture Credit: Wonderful Engineering.  

The greatest global security threat of the 21st century is the United States of America's fear of losing its status as the world hegemony. From this fear precipitates actions - in the name of "strategic manoeuvring" - that have destabilized, to name only the latest places: Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Ukraine. Ukraine represents exactly the kind of overreach, on the United States' part, that may result in the unthinkable.

This is the top tier of global security threats, all other threats should be viewed through this prism. It is also not necessarily that America is evil, Thucydides writing in the 5th Century already showed that all pre-eminent powers will behave this way. The only difference now is that a war fought to maintain such a hegemony will be the last war.