What Lessons For Military Men From Israel's Exploding Pager Attacks On Lebanon?

by Kudakwashe Kanhutu There are no new lessons to be learnt, just a reminder of an old one: Autarky. This lesson was beginning to get lost even on a Superpower like Russia. No matter how efficiently produced or, how cheap the cost, you should NEVER buy anything from your adversaries. EVER. I was quite surprised that Iran was still using US made Helicopters for Presidential Transport when Russia (an ally) is a leader at Helicopter production.

The Tight Embrace Between Terrorism And The Electronic Media?

Participating at the 13th International Terrorism and Electronic Media Conference in Sofia, Bulgaria.

by Kudakwashe Kanhutu.

Sofia, Bulgaria.   

It is quite the intractable problem for humanity through the ages isn’t it, that good and bad exist so proximately that they are, in fact, two sides of the same coin. Flip the coin this way and the good side faces you, flip it again and there is every chance that it’s the bad side that faces you. Technology and innovation espouse this metaphor most emphatically, as every piece of technology ever invented to aid humanity positively, can also be used to harm humanity. Case in point, at the dawn of Terrorism, Dynamite, whose primary purpose was to make mining and construction easier, was quite the God sent for anarchist terrorism – the power that had previously been the preserve of States, became easily available to individuals. It is, therefore, humanity’s lot that every advantage comes with a disadvantage, every opportunity creates vulnerability. 

Indeed, it’s a very thin line that separates good from bad in almost every aspect of human affairs; free speech can easily stray into hate speech, explaining issues can be misconstrued as glorifying them and, that last example is especially pertinent to the Media and Terrorism sphere. There seems to be a tight embrace between Terrorism and the Media. As Terrorism is said to never be aimed at its victims, but at its audience, the Media tends to always be, perhaps unwittingly, the “megaphone” of Terrorism. If the above premise holds, there is even a tighter embrace between Terrorism and the Electronic Media. Technology and Innovation have democratised the Media space, and various actors, including the Terrorists themselves, now have their own “megaphones.” Technology can now be used equally to glorify the good as well as the bad. 

This conundrum is exactly what the International Academy of Television and Radio (IATR ) wants to appraise every year. They hold an annual conference to survey exactly what the relationship is between Terrorism and the Media, especially Electronic Media. There is no shortage of guidelines as the United Nations’ various bodies have discussed the issue ad infinitum. The IATR conference is a chance to discuss what these guidelines mean in practice. It is attended by journalists, civil society, academics, and government officials, who all then exchange views on what the field looks like to them. It’s a chance to discuss each other’s concerns and constraints which culminates in an outcome document. 

While the duty of every responsible citizen is to contribute to the well-being of society, for example by not glorifying Terrorism, the discussions at this year’s 13th International Conference in Sofia Bulgaria, leaned more towards the governments’ worldview, to the exclusion of the legitimate concerns of those who tend to resort to Terrorism. I suppose it was inevitable that the discussion would turn out like this, because as I said above, saying Terrorists have legitimate concerns could be easily be misconstrued as sympathising with them, and can even land one in prison. I got the impression however, that the gathering is open to new ideas. What is needed at next year’s conference, is more people from the critical schools of thought who will challenge the gathering if it falls too much on the side of establishment mentality. The networking value of the same event is great, in that it can create a just-below-government consensus, that can then inform policy, even among governments that are antagonistic towards each other.

13th International Terrorism and Electronic Media Conference.

Bulgarian Defence Minister Krasimir Karakachanov at the Conference.

Bulgarian Defence Minister Krasimir Karakachanov at the Conference.

Discussing the current state of terrorism and electronic media with delegates from Croatia, Serbia and Romania. 

Stjepan Mesić, the last President of Yugoslavia before dissolution, the Syrian Ambassador to Bulgaria, the President of the Serbian Parliament and various other attendees.

Stjepan Mesić, the last President of Yugoslavia before dissolution.

Stjepan Mesić, the last President of Yugoslavia before dissolution.

Information Superiority In Warfare: A Myth?

A diagrammatic representation of USAF Col John Boyd's Observe - Orient - Decide - Act (OODA) Loop.

The above decision making model will be my reference point during my attendance at a major warfare conference in London in the next few days. The OODA Loop is fully explained here and a good example of how Donald Trump has (unwittingly) used it appears here 

The conference is on information superiority in warfare and, make no mistake, information, in all walks of life, is an invaluable commodity. The thing to remember, however, is that information has its own nature and rules which defy total domestication even by the most dedicated adherent. So, even before I attend this important conference, I am already circumspect about the grand pronouncement western war fighting says it aims at;  

Information Superiority is defined by Western militaries as “the operational advantage derived from the ability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to do the same.” 

With an annual budget of over US$700 billion, failures to win (outright) the war in Afghanistan, makes a mockery of such a grand pronouncement and opens up avenues to discuss more decisive factors in warfare.

The Gerasimov Doctrine: The Value Of Science In Prediction.

“Fas est et ab hoste doceri” - Ovid. [“It is right to learn, even from the enemy”]  

As Russia's position is dialogical (and not axiological), with regards intervening in African States's affairs, it follows then that African militaries are better off borrowing from the Gerasimov Doctrine than from the Western Doctrine. The former enumerates all the ways interventionist powers threaten African States, while the latter asks African States to make themselves susceptible to intervention. The Gerasimov Doctrine refers to an article by the Russian Chief of the General Staff - Colonel General Valery Gerasimov - which appeared in the Russian Academy of Military Science’s Military-Industrial Courier, and was titled “The Value of Science in Prediction.” It has since been misinterpreted by Western commentators but you can read it here for yourself;

The reclaiming of Crimea by Russian Armed Forces stunned the world and made a nondescript February 2013 entry, in the Military - Industrial Courier, the subject of intense study.

THE VALUE OF SCIENCE IN PREDICTION 

by Colonel General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Federation. 

The Military – Industrial Courier, 27th February 2013. 

In the 21st century we have seen a tendency toward blurring the lines between the states of war and peace. Wars are no longer declared and, having begun, proceed according to an unfamiliar template. The experience of military conflicts — including those connected with the so-called coloured revolutions in north Africa and the Middle East — confirm that a perfectly thriving state can, in a matter of months and even days, be transformed into an arena of fierce armed conflict, become a victim of foreign intervention, and sink into a web of chaos, humanitarian catastrophe, and civil war. 

The Lessons of the ‘Arab Spring’ 

Of course, it would be easiest of all to say that the events of the “Arab Spring” are not war and so there are no lessons for us — military men — to learn. But maybe the opposite is true — that precisely these events are typical of warfare in the 21st century. In terms of the scale of the casualties and destruction, the catastrophic social, economic, and political consequences, such new-type conflicts are comparable with the consequences of any real war. The very “rules of war” have changed. The role of non-military means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness. 

The focus of applied methods of conflict has altered in the direction of the broad use of political, economic, informational, humanitarian, and other non-military measures — applied in coordination with the protest potential of the population. All this is supplemented by military means of a concealed character, including carrying out actions of informational conflict and the actions of special-operations forces. The open use of forces — often under the guise of peacekeeping and crisis regulation — is resorted to only at a certain stage, primarily for the achievement of final success in the conflict. 

From this proceed logical questions: What is modern war? What should the army be prepared for? How should it be armed? Only after answering these questions can we determine the directions of the construction and development of the armed forces over the long term. To do this, it is essential to have a clear understanding of the forms and methods of the use of the application of force. 

These days, together with traditional devices, nonstandard ones are being developed. The role of mobile, mixed-type groups of forces, acting in a single intelligence-information space because of the use of the new possibilities of command-and-control systems has been strengthened. Military actions are becoming more dynamic, active, and fruitful. Tactical and operational pauses that the enemy could exploit are disappearing. New information technologies have enabled significant reductions in the spatial, temporal, and informational gaps between forces and control organs. Frontal engagements of large formations of forces at the strategic and operational level are gradually becoming a thing of the past. Long-distance, contactless actions against the enemy are becoming the main means of achieving combat and operational goals. The defeat of the enemy’s objects is conducted throughout the entire depth of his territory. The differences between strategic, operational, and tactical levels, as well as between offensive and defensive operations, are being erased. The application of high-precision weaponry is taking on a mass character. Weapons based on new physical principals and automatized systems are being actively incorporated into military activity. 

Asymmetrical actions have come into widespread use, enabling the nullification of an enemy’s advantages in armed conflict. Among such actions are the use of special operations forces and internal opposition to create a permanently operating front through the entire territory of the enemy state, as well as informational actions, devices, and means that are constantly being perfected. These ongoing changes are reflected in the doctrinal views of the world’s leading states and are being used in military conflicts. Already in 1991, during Operation Desert Storm in Iraq, the U.S. military realized the concept of “global sweep, global power” and “air-ground operations.” In 2003 during Operation Iraqi Freedom, military operations were conducted in accordance with the so-called Single Perspective 2020. 

Now, the concepts of “global strike” and “global missile defense” have been worked out, which foresee the defeat of enemy objects and forces in a matter of hours from almost any point on the globe, while at the same time ensuring the prevention of unacceptable harm from an enemy counterstrike. The United States is also enacting the principles of the doctrine of global integration of operations aimed at creating in a very short time highly mobile, mixed-type groups of forces. 

In recent conflicts, new means of conducting military operations have appeared that cannot be considered purely military. An example of this is the operation in Libya, where a no-fly zone was created, a sea blockade imposed, private military contractors were widely used in close interaction with armed formations of the opposition. 

We must acknowledge that, while we understand the essence of traditional military actions carried out by regular armed forces, we have only a superficial understanding of asymmetrical forms and means. In this connection, the importance of military science — which must create a comprehensive theory of such actions — is growing. The work and research of the Academy of Military Science can help with this. 

The Tasks of Military Science 

In a discussion of the forms and means of military conflict, we must not forget about our own experience. I mean the use of partisan units during the Great Patriotic War and the fight against irregular formations in Afghanistan and the North Caucasus. I would emphasize that during the Afghanistan War specific forms and means of conducting military operations were worked out. At their heart lay speed, quick movements, the smart use of tactical Paratroops and encircling forces which all together enable the interruption of the enemy’s plans and brought him significant losses. 

Another factor influencing the essence of modern means of armed conflict is the use of modern automated complexes of military equipment and research in the area of artificial intelligence. While today we have flying drones, tomorrow’s battlefields will be filled with walking, crawling, jumping, and flying robots. In the near future it is possible a fully robotized unit will be created, capable of independently conducting military operations. 

How shall we fight under such conditions? What forms and means should be used against a robotized enemy? What sort of robots do we need and how can they be developed? Already today our military minds must be thinking about these questions. 

The most important set of problems, requiring intense attention, is connected with perfecting the forms and means of applying groups of forces. It is necessary to rethink the content of the strategic activities of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Already now questions are arising: Is such a number of strategic operations necessary? Which ones and how many of them will we need in the future? So far, there are no answers. 

There are also other problems that we are encountering in our daily activities. We are currently in the final phase of the formation of a system of air-space defense (VKO). Because of this, the question of the development of forms and means of action using VKO forces and tools has become actual. The General Staff is already working on this. I propose that the Academy of Military Science also take active part. 

The information space opens wide asymmetrical possibilities for reducing the fighting potential of the enemy. In North Africa, we witnessed the use of technologies for influencing state structures and the population with the help of information networks. It is necessary to perfect activities in the information space, including the defense of our own objects. 

The operation to force Georgia to peace exposed the absence of unified approaches to the use of formations of the Armed Forces outside of the Russian Federation. The September 2012 attack on the U.S. consulate in the Libyan city of Benghazi , the activization of piracy activities, the recent hostage taking in Algeria all confirm the importance of creating a system of armed defense of the interests of the state outside the borders of its territory. 

Although the additions to the federal law “On Defense” adopted in 2009 allow the operational use of the Armed Forces of Russia outside of its borders, the forms and means of their activity are not defined. In addition, matters of facilitating their operational use have not been settled on the inter-ministerial level. This includes simplifying the procedure for crossing state borders, the use of the airspace and territorial waters of foreign states, the procedures for interacting with the authorities of the state of destination, and so on. It is necessary to convene the joint work of the research organizations of the pertinent ministries and agencies on such matters. 

One of the forms of the use of military force outside the country is peacekeeping. In addition to traditional tasks, their activity could include more specific tasks such as specialized, humanitarian, rescue, evacuation, sanitation, and other tasks. At present, their classification, essence, and content have not been defined. Moreover, the complex and multifarious tasks of peacekeeping which, possibly, regular troops will have to carry out, presume the creation of a fundamentally new system for preparing them. After all, the task of a peacekeeping force is to disengage conflicting sides, protect and save the civilian population, cooperate in reducing potential violence and re-establish peaceful life. All this demands academic preparation. 

Controlling Territory 

It is becoming increasingly important in modern conflicts to be capable of defending one’s population, objects, and communications from the activity of special-operations forces, in view of their increasing use. Resolving this problem envisions the organization and introduction of territorial defense. Before 2008, when the army at war time numbered more than 4.5 million men, these tasks were handled exclusively by the armed forces. But conditions have changed. Now, countering diversionary-reconnaissance and terroristic forces can only be organized by the complex involvement of all the security and law-enforcement forces of the country. 

The General Staff has begun this work. It is based on defining the approaches to the organization of territorial defense that were reflected in the changes to the federal law “On Defense.” Since the adoption of that law, it is necessary to define the system of managing territorial defense and to legally enforce the role and location in it of other forces, military formations, and the organs of other state structures. We need well-grounded recommendations on the use of interagency forces and means for the fulfillment of territorial defense, methods for combatting the terrorist and diversionary forces of the enemy under modern conditions. 

The experience of conducting military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq has shown the necessity of working out — together with the research bodies of other ministries and agencies of the Russian Federation — the role and extent of participation of the armed forces in post conflict regulation, working out the priority of tasks, the methods for activation of forces, and establishing the limits of the use of armed force. 

[…]  

You Can’t Generate Ideas On Command 

The state of Russian military science today cannot be compared with the flowering of military-theoretical thought in our country on the eve of World War II. Of course, there are objective and subjective reasons for this and it is not possible to blame anyone in particular for it. I am not the one who said it is not possible to generate ideas on command. I agree with that, but I also must acknowledge something else: at that time, there were no people with higher degrees and there were no academic schools or departments. There were extraordinary personalities with brilliant ideas. I would call them fanatics in the best sense of the word. Maybe we just don’t have enough people like that today. 

People like, for instance, Georgy Isserson, who, despite the views he formed in the prewar years, published the book “New Forms Of Combat.” In it, this Soviet military theoretician predicted: “War in general is not declared. It simply begins with already developed military forces. Mobilization and concentration is not part of the period after the onset of the state of war as was the case in 1914 but rather, unnoticed, proceeds long before that.” The fate of this “prophet of the Fatherland” unfolded tragically. Our country paid in great quantities of blood for not listening to the conclusions of this professor of the General Staff Academy. 

What can we conclude from this? A scornful attitude toward new ideas, to nonstandard approaches, to other points of view is unacceptable in military science. And it is even more unacceptable for practitioners to have this attitude toward science. 

In conclusion, I would like to say that no matter what forces the enemy has, no matter how well-developed his forces and means of armed conflict may be, forms and methods for overcoming them can be found. He will always have vulnerabilities and that means that adequate means of opposing him exist. We must not copy foreign experience and chase after leading countries, but we must outstrip them and occupy leading positions ourselves. This is where military science takes on a crucial role. 

The outstanding Soviet military scholar Aleksandr Svechin wrote: “It is extraordinarily hard to predict the conditions of war. For each war it is necessary to work out a particular line for its strategic conduct. Each war is a unique case, demanding the establishment of a particular logic and not the application of some template.” This approach continues to be correct. Each war does present itself as a unique case, demanding the comprehension of its particular logic, its uniqueness. That is why the character of a war that Russia or its allies might be drawn into is very hard to predict. Nonetheless, we must. Any academic pronouncements in military science are worthless if military theory is not backed by the function of prediction. 

[…]

Colonel General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Federation.

ISIS May Yet Punch Way Above Its Weight

The Russian Su - 24 All Weather Bomber that was shot down by Turkey in Syria on 24 November 2015.

If the unthinkable - nuclear war - were to happen over Turkey's downing of a Russian bomber jet in Syria, then ISIS will have punched way above its weight in style. The fable that readily comes to mind in illustration, is the African folk tale: The Hare, the Elephant and the Hippopotamus. 

The True Condition of Air Safety In The Decade 2011 - 2021

EI - ETJ. The MetroJet Airbus A321 - 200 Aircraft that crashed over the Sinai Desert while operating as Flight 7K9268. Picture Credit: Al Arabiya English.

All governments are essentially cut from the same cloth. If the governments of Egypt and Russia can help it, they will pass off the recent MetroJet plane crash in the Sinai Desert as having been caused by a technical fault rather than by an act of terrorism. Egypt's concern will be its image and tourism industry, while Russia will not want ISIS to claim to have the capability of striking back at Russia at a time and place of its choosing. 

The French, British, German and Emirati governments are not taking any chances and have announced a ban on their flag carriers flying over the Sinai. There is an element of the Russia vs the West in the announcement of this precaution, but that element is not relevant to the subject of this post: the true condition of the air safety environment in this decade.

ISIS has claimed to have downed Flight 7K9268 using surface to air missiles but, this is not credible as ISIS does not have the missile systems to strike at aircraft at cruising altitudes. The danger to aircraft landing and taking off from North Africa is, however, very real as 20 000 Man Portable Air Defence Systems  (MANPADS) were looted during NATO's toppling of Colonel Gaddafi in 2011. So, the full stock of the fallout from that NATO misadventure is yet to be taken.

What is credible, at this stage, is that a bomb may have been placed on the Sharm el-Sheikh to St Petersburg flight before take off. I worked on the airside for the airline for a considerable time and know for a fact that the one thing that protects passengers is not so much the security screening equipment, but the people who man those systems. If a greater section of the population is disaffected, as all those who supported the Muslim Brotherhood are, you install the best security equipment in vain as there are ways to bypass it. Further danger will come when non state actors get access to air  defence systems more sophisticated than MANPADS.

The true condition of air safety, therefore, is that it is unravelling. What has largely caused this to happen is United States military adventurism and disregard for the cornerstone of international order that is non-intervention in the domestic affairs of sovereign states. United States actions have started, and will continue to create ungoverned spaces where non state actors will have missile systems capable of bringing down aircraft at previously unassailable heights. Of course, the transatlantic routes, the European airspaces and Asian airspaces will still be safe - for now.

The Most Potent Global Security Threat Of The Twenty First Century

The unthinkable is the logical conclusion of all the great powers' strategic manoeuvring. Picture Credit: Wonderful Engineering.  

The greatest global security threat of the 21st century is the United States of America's fear of losing its status as the world hegemony. From this fear precipitates actions - in the name of "strategic manoeuvring" - that have destabilized, to name only the latest places: Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Ukraine. Ukraine represents exactly the kind of overreach, on the United States' part, that may result in the unthinkable.

This is the top tier of global security threats, all other threats should be viewed through this prism. It is also not necessarily that America is evil, Thucydides writing in the 5th Century already showed that all pre-eminent powers will behave this way. The only difference now is that a war fought to maintain such a hegemony will be the last war.