Monday, 16 July 2018

The White City Grenade Attack And Its National Security Implications



“Make us enemies of every people on earth, but save us from civil war” - Lucan, Bellum Civile, c. 48.

The aftermath of the grenade attack.

The grenade attack aimed at assassinating President Emmerson Mnangagwa of Zimbabwe, at White City Stadium, on 23 June 2018, missed its target completely but killed 2 aides and injured Vice President Kembo Mohadi as well as Minister Oppah Muchinguri Kashiri. This grenade could have potentially wiped out the country’s Presidency and a host of high ranking officials. There was no claim of responsibility so we can only make educated guesses as to who was responsible. As for the National Security implications, we can discuss that with what approaches mathematical certainty.

Who Was Responsible?

If we really want to get to know who was responsible, we must discuss matters objectively. First to go is the notion that what happened in Zimbabwe in November was not a Coup. It was a Military Coup. Necessary yes, but it was a Military Coup. Whoever was aggrieved by this change of the man at the helm, is the first suspect in deciding who could have tried to assassinate the current President. This step will also allow us to get to the next step: political implications had the assassination attempt succeeded.

President Mnangagwa has accused the G40 faction in ZANU PF as the people responsible for this latest attempt on his life. The G40 was the other competitor to succeed Robert Mugabe, and they lost out their pole position when Mugabe was removed from power. By accusing the G40, President Mnangagwa is really accusing Robert Mugabe, as the G40 was Mugabe’s favoured project in ZANU PF prior to his ouster. The accusation against Robert Mugabe also sticks because he has not been repentant, and has shown himself very willing to politically undermine President Emmerson Mnangagwa. Either Robert Mugabe ordered the grenade attack himself, or those still loyal to him did it without his say so, but he would have been the (willing) political beneficiary had the attack succeeded.

If I know the above dynamics, enemies of Zimbabwe also know the same dynamics and could have carried out the attack to throw the country, or at least ZANU PF, into civil war/conflict. As to what these other people would benefit from such a scenario, one would have to know all the concerned parties and their interests, and how those interests would be served by a civil war. It is beyond the scope of this short entry to make such an analysis.

Political Implications:

Had President Mnangagwa and his two Vice Presidents been eliminated, Constitutional Lawyers will tell you that the Speaker of Parliament would have assumed the Presidency until Elections had been held, but that’s just lazy theorizing. The reality is this: those who carried out this attack would have wanted Robert Mugabe reinstated as President, as a “corrective measure” against the Military Coup that removed him in November. It would then be up to Mugabe to go ahead with Elections, or declare a State of Emergency to allow him time to get back at his “enemies” in the Armed Forces of Zimbabwe. This is also where the grenade attack planners show their myopia, or desperation; the Military, instead, would have stepped in automatically and ruled Zimbabwe under State of Emergency powers. There is a unity in the Command Element of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces that has defied outsider meddling for a long time (as Robert Mugabe found out when he tried to set then Lt. General Valerio Sibanda, against General Chiwenga, on his return from China in November last year).

National Security Implications:

The throwing of the grenade was a desperate act of people who would rather see the country burn in a civil war than prosper under someone else. A scorched earth policy mentality that very much characterised Robert Mugabe’s conduct towards the time of his removal from office. The possibility of a civil war was there had President Mnangagwa’s calming influence at the helm been removed. The military’s first instinct is to use force. After all, you can be assured that Robert Mugabe has not yet suffered the fate of Gaddafi only because President Mnangagwa holds in check, this extreme instinct of the security establishment. Robert Mugabe also did this same thing very well with Morgan Tsvangirayi. There are times when Diplomacy trumps the use of force. Without this calming civilian influence, the military would make missteps that will lead to civil war (or the need for intervention by outsiders).